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shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, tin it i ipon probable cause, supported by 
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describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
Utah Const, art. I, S 14s 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall 
isue but upon probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the person or 
thing to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(5)(a)i 
(5) Prohibited acts E—Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of 
this section, a person not authorized under 
this chapter who commits any act declared to 
be unlawful under this section, Chapter 37a, 
Title 58, the Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or 
under Chapter 37b, Title 58, the Imitation 
Controlled Substances Act, is upon conviction 
subject to the penalties and classifications 
under Subsection (5)(b) if the act is 
committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary 
or secondary school or on the grounds of 
any of those schools; 
(ii) in those portions of any building, 
park, stadium, or other structure or 
grounds which are, at the time of the act, 
being used for an activity sponsored by or 
through a school under Subsection 
(5)(a)(i); 
(iii) within 1,000 feet of any 
structure, facility, or grounds included 
in Subsection (5)(a)(1) or (ii); or 
(iv) with a person younger than 18 
years of age, regardless of where the act 
occurs. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Lane Stromberg, was charged with Unlawful 
Possession of Cocaine with the Intent to Distribute within 1000 
feet of a school, a First Degree Felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. S 58-37-8(1)(a)(Supp. 1989), and Unlawful Possession of 
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Marijuana within 1000 feet of a school, a Third Degree Felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a) (Supp. 1989) (R. 
135-36). Defendant was convicted of Unlawful Possession of 
Marijuana within 1,000 feet of a school, a Third Degree Felony, 
after a jury trial held September 21 and 22, 1988, in the Second 
Judicial District, in and for Davis County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Rodney S. Page, Judge, presiding (R. 81). He was 
acquitted of the charge of possession of cocaine (R. 83). 
Defendant was sentenced by Judge Page on November 1, 1988, to a 
term of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison and fined 
$4,000 plus a surcharge of $1000 (R. 172). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On May 20, 1988, Judge Alfred C. Van Wagenen issued a 
search warrant for the defendant's home at 1487 South 1250 West, 
Syracuse, Utah. (R. 9-10). (See Appendix "A"; Search Warrant and 
Affidavit.) The search warrant was issued based on probable 
cause shown in an affidavit submitted by Syracuse Chief of Police 
John Gardiner. (R. 5-7). The affidavit stated that the officer 
had reason to believe that controlled substances and drug 
paraphernalia were being possessed illegally at defendant's 
address. Icl. The affidavit was based on information which was 
disclosed on April 25, 1988 in an interview between Syracuse 
Chief of Police John Gardiner and Tessie Heber who had accused 
defendant of unlawful sexual intercourse. (R. 6, S.T. 13). 
Because the transcripts have not been assigned appellate record 
numbers, the trial record will be referred to as "R.", the trial 
transcript of September 21, 1988 as "Tl."# the trial transcript 
of September 22, 1988, as MT2.# and the suppression hearing 
transcript as MS.T.M 
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Tessie was fifteen years old at the time of the sexual 
encounter and was a friend of the defedant's fifteen-year-old 
daughter. (R. 6, S.T. 50, 152-53). The encounter occurred in the 
D's bedroom during the first week of March 1988. (R. 6, S.T. 16) 
Tessie informed Chief Gardiner that during her numerous visits to 
defendant's home in the last year and a half, she had observed an 
ongoing pattern of illegal drug activites (R. 6). Tessie 
observed defendant smoke marijuana on 3 or 4 occasions and saw 
several marijuana pipes lying around the house on a continuing 
basis at various locations including the headboard of defendant's 
waterbed, the kitchen area, and the basement. (R. 6, S.T. 17). 
Tessie explained that the last time she had been in defendant's 
home was during the first week of March when the sexual incident 
occurred and that she had observed a marijuana pipe on that 
occasion (R. 6, S.T. 21). 
The affidavit further stated that Chief Gardiner 
verified Tessie's relationship with defendant's daughter and that 
Tessie had no juvenile record. (S.T. 56, 167-68). Gardiner also 
determined that defendant had a prior conviction for possession 
of marijuana in 1980 and that persons who smoke marijuana often 
retain possession of pipes and other paraphernalia for up to 
seven years. (S.T. 118, 121-22). 
On May 20, 1988, the search warrant was executed. (R. 
8). The search of defendant's home and garage produced over 100 
grams of marijuana, over a kilo of cocaine, five marijuana pipes, 
and other drug paraphernalia. (R. 11-14). The marijuana pipes 
were found in defendant's bed frame and in the vanity of 
defendant's bathroom. (Tl. 99, 175-76). The marijuana was found 
in a plastic baggie and in mason jars located on the headboard of 
defendant's bed and also in the kitchen. (Tl. 97-98). The 
cocaine was located in a Coleman cooler in the garage. (Tl. 149-
51). Drug paraphernalia, such as a tri-beam scales, a spoon, a 
razor blade, mannitol (cocaine cutting agent), and several 
screens, were found in and near the defendant's desk in the 
basement. (Tl. 183-84, 190). A white residue on the scales 
tested positive for cocaine. (Tl. 48). 
On August 16, 1988, D filed a motion to suppress the 
evidence obtained pursuant to the search warrant (R. 54-55). 
After a hearing on September 2, 1988, Judge Page denied 
defendant's suppression motions. (R. 69-75). 
At trial, defendant admitted to having used both 
marijuana and cocaine in the past. (Tl. 2-103). Defendant 
testified that the last time he had used cocaine was in May 1988 
(Tl. 104). He testified he knew marijuana was in the headboard 
of his bed and that marijuana pipes were in his bathroom vanity 
(T2. 106-08). Defendant's girlfriend, Helen Watkins, testified 
and verified that she and defendant had smoked marijuana together 
in the defendant's bedroom (T2. 51). Greg Wiser, defendant's 
friend, also testified that he had smoked marijuana with 
defendant (T. 2-145). Defendant's sixteen-year-old daughter 
testified at the suppression hearing that she had seen marijuana 
pipes in their home (S.T. 157). She also testified that she knew 
defendant kept marijuana in their home (S.T. 158). 
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Based on the evidence adduced at trial, the jury found 
defendant guilty of possession of marijuana within 1000 feet of a 
school (T2. 159-161). Defendant now appeals. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Judge Page properly denied defendant's motion to 
suppress the evidence where the affidavit in support of the 
search warrant contained sufficient information to support the 
magistrate's finding of probable cause. The information showing 
the continuing nature of defendant's illegal drug possession and 
use justified a finding that under the totality of the 
circumstances it could be reasonably inferred that evidence of 
illegal drugs would be located at defendant's home. Moreover, 
great deference should be afforded a magistrate's finding of 
probable cause. Overturning such a finding by a magistrate, such 
as in this case, is proper only if the reviewing court firmly 
believes that a mistake has been made. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(5)(a)(iii)(Supp. 1989), which 
enhances the penalty for drug activity occurring within 1000 feet 
of a school, is constitutionally sound in light of the State's 
strong interest in eradicating drug use among school children. 
Since increasing the penalties for drug activities near schools 
is a rational means of achieving the State's interest, the 
enhancement statute should be upheld as constitutional. 
-£_ 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE AFFIDAVIT ESTABLISHED SUFFICIENT PROBABLE 
CAUSE TO SUPPORT THE ISSUANCE OF A SEARCH 
WARRANT 
On appeal, defendant challenges the district court's 
denial of his motion to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to 
the search warrant. Specifically, defendant alleges there was no 
probable cause because the information contained in the affidavit 
2 
supporting the search warrant was stale. 
In determining the validity of a search warrant, the 
Utah Supreme Court has limited a court's review to whether the 
judge "had a substantial basis to conclude that in the totality 
of the circumstances, the affidavit adequately established 
probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant." State v. 
Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 129 (Utah 1987). "Probable cause," in this 
context, "is nothing more than a reasonable belief that the 
evidence sought is located at the place indicated by the 
policeman's affidavit." United States v. Dill, 693 F.2d 1012, 
1014 (10th Cir. 1982) . 
Moreover, "[a] reviewing court should pay great 
deference to a magistrate's determination of probable cause." 
State v. Romero, 660 P.2d 715, 719 (Utah 1983); State v. Jordan, 
665 P.2d 1280, 1286 (Utah 1983). Since it is the duty and 
prerogative of the magistrate to determine the sufficiency of the 
2 
Because defendant does not support his claim with separate 
state constitutional analysis, this court should consider 
defendant's claim based solely on federal constitutional grounds. 
See State v. Williams, 107 Utah Adv. Rep. 48, 52 n.12 (S. Ct. 
05/05/89). 
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affidavit, such a determination should not be overturned unless 
he or she was clearly in error. State v. Tapp, 26 Utah 392, 490 
P.2d 334 (1971). More recently, the Utah Supreme Court in State 
v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987), stated that "[t]he question 
for the appellate court . . . is not whether it would have made 
the findings the trial court did, but whether 'on the entire 
evidence [it] is left with the definite and firm conviction that 
a mistake has been made committed.'" I_d. a t 1258, n.5, quoting 
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 
(1969). 
Defendant seeks to undermine the magistrate's finding 
of probable cause by emphasizing that over two months elapsed 
between the observation of marijuana and marijuana pipes in 
defendant's home and the issuance of the warrant. 
The Fourth Amendment mandates that search warrants be 
issued only upon a showing of probable cause and it is undisputed 
that time is a critical element in establishing probable cause. 
United States v. McCall, 740 F.2d 1331, 1335 (4th Cir. 1984). A 
search warrant is said to be stale when the observation of the 
incriminating evidence is so remote in time from the application 
for the warrant as to render it improbable that the evidence 
still exists at the stated location. 
In Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206 (1932), Chief 
Justice Hughes set forth the general rule governing staleness 
issues as follows: 
While the statute does not fix the time 
within which proof of probable cause must be 
taken by the judge or commissioner, it is 
manifest that the proof must be of facts so 
closely related to the time of the issued of 
the warrant as to justify a finding of 
probable cause at that time. Whether the 
proof meets this test must be determined by 
the circumstances of each case. 
Id. at 210-11. In considering the "circumstances" of each case, 
the "excessive technical dissection of an informant's tip or of 
the nontechnical language in the officer's affidavit is ill-
suited to this task." State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d at 130. 
The mere passage of time alone is not the sole factor 
in determining staleness. "The vitality of probable cause cannot 
be quantified by simply counting the number of days between the 
occurrence of the facts relied upon and the issuance of the 
affidavit." United States v. Johnson, 461 F.2d 285, 287 (10th 
Cir. 1972). Common sense dictates that together with time, the 
court must also consider the nature of the unlawful activity. 
Where an affidavit recites a mere isolated violation, it is 
reasonable to believe that probable cause quickly dwindles with 
the passage of time. However, if an affidavit recites activity 
indicating protracted or continuous conduct, time is of less 
significance. United States v. Minis, 666 F.2d 134, 140 (5th Cir. 
1982), cert, denied, 456 U.S 946 (1982). 
Accordingly, many courts have found probable cause to 
exist where the illegal activity was on-going in nature, despite 
substantial gaps between the observation of the evidence at the 
particular premises and the issuance of a search warrant. In the 
Fifth Circuit determined that the ongoing nature of a marijuana 
cultivating operation warranted the magistrate's inference that 
marijuana plants observed in June would still be present in 
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October. Rl. See also, United States v. Dennis, 625 F.2d 782 
(8th Cir. 1980) (ongoing loansharking operation); State v. Hyde, 
574 F.2d 856 (5th Cir. 1978) (ongoing drug smuggling operation); 
United States v. Beltempo, 675 F.2d 472 (2nd Cir. 1982)(52 days 
would not vitiate probable cause for ongoing scheme of illegal 
importation of heroin). 
Courts have also noted that the business of dealing in 
illegal drugs is ordinarily a regenerating activity carried on 
over a period of time and that probable cause may continue for 
several weeks, if not months, of the last reported instance of 
suspected activity. United States v. Angulo-Lopez, 791 F.2d 
1394, 1399 (9th Cir. 1986); Davidson v. State, 458 A.2d 875, 880 
(Md. App. 1983). Thus, a warrant authorizing a search for 
controlled substances may be properly issued weeks after an 
informant observes the illegal drugs. United States v. Angulo-
Lopez , 791 F.2d 1394, 1399 (9th Cir. 1986) (approximately 24 
days); Davidson v. State, 458 A.2d 875, 879 (Md. App. 1983)(19 
days); State v. Blaurock, 143 N.J. Super 476, 363 A.2d 909 (1976) 
(18 days). 
The Utah Supreme Court has also upheld search warrants 
where there was a reasonable inference that the drug activity was 
of a continuous nature. In State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258 
(Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court found that a search warrant 
for marijuana was not stale although the affidavit failed to 
state the date when the informant observed contraband at 
defendant's residence. Notwithstanding the fact that the 
magistrate had no knowledge of how remote the information was, 
the Court held that "the affidavit in the instant case, couched 
as it is in the present-tense language which described on-going 
criminal activity, clearly refutes any contention that it was 
based upon stale information." Jd. (Citations omitted.) The 
Anderton court upheld that search warrant because "a common-sense 
reading of that affidavit suggested the continuing nature of the 
drug's presence." State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d at 131. 
In the case at bar, the affidavit in totality supports 
a determination that defendant's involvement with marijuana was 
protracted and continuous in nature. (See Appendix "A"; Search 
Warrant and Affdiavit.) The affidavit alleged not a single 
incident, but a series of incidents which commenced February 14, 
1980 and continued until at least the first week of March 1987 
when the informant saw a marijuana pipe in defendant's home. (R. 
6, S.T. 21). The magistrate knew that defendant had been 
convicted of possession of marijuana in 1980 (R. 7). He knew 
that over the last year and half, defendant had been observed 
smoking marijuana three or four times in his home and that as 
late as March 1988 there was evidence of contraband in 
defendant's home (R. 6). The magistrate also knew that defendant 
had drug paraphernalia in several locations in his house (R. 6). 
The affidavit established that defendant followed a 
persistent pattern of criminal involvement relating to illegal 
narcotics. The continuing nature of defendant's drug involvement 
suggests the continuing validity of the information contained in 
the affidavit. Presented with this evidence, the magistrate was 
justified in drawing the inference that at the time of the 
warrant application, probable cause existed that defendant still 
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possessed incriminating evidence at his home. Thus, the validity 
of the search warrant should be upheld. 
Even assuming the affidavit was inadequate due to 
staleness, this Court should not exclude the evidence where the 
search was conducted in "good faith." See United States v. Leon, 
468 U.S. 897 (1984) . 
In Leon, the lower court had suppressed evidence 
obtained pursuant to a search warrant because the underlying 
affidavit contained "fatally stale" information and an inadequate 
basis upon which to determine the reliability and credibility of 
the informant. ]jd. at 904. The Leon court overturned the 
suppression order and held that the exclusionary rule does not 
apply to evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable 
reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral 
magistrate, but which warrant is ultimately found to be invalid. 
Id. at 905-25. See also United States v. Anderson, 851 F.2d 727 
(4th Cir. 1988) (good-faith exception to exclusionary rule was 
sufficient to insulate warrant from attack of staleness); People 
v. Deitchman, 695 P.2d 1146 (Colo. 1985) (good faith exception 
applies to staleness issues). 
In the case at bar, the search warrant had been issued 
by a detached and neutral magistrate (R. 9-10). The officers, 
reasonably relied on the warrant insearching only those places 
and on those objects covered by the warrant. Moreover, in 
denying defendant's motion for suppression, Judge Page found that 
the officer had acted with objective good faith and found that 
the evidence was admissible under the good-faith exception (R. 
6 9 - 7 4 ) 1 mi I M|h1 n I t In It in I 1 hull i I M <M t f i i> i 'i ai t H I ! w i f h 
objective good faith i i i obtaining the warrant ai id acted 
reasonably with -^  c- .:. • * - Court should not exclude the 
f»V 1 l i ^ l l C P O l i t ri 1 I - - ' fJl I" I 'd III! t . 
Defendant also argues that the search warrant was 
pretextual. However, as shown abovef the information contained 
in the affidavit was sufficient to establish pro:.:. cause to 
support the issuance of the search warrant. More importantly, 
defendant fails to give any legal analysis or authority setting 
forth the applicable legal principles in support of his pretext 
argument In that "[t]he burden of showing error is on the party 
v • 11 . F*•'ek s i i i M State v. Jones , 65 7 i: ?-1 ] ?63 , 
1267 (Utah 1982 . • State should n~t ho put to the task of 
developing defendant ? is'li. arguments ' citing relevant case 
a u 11 i o i i t y t : • s i , , . * • : «- . i a ] ] e g a t i c • :i :t s . 
Accordingly, this Court need not address this issue. State v. 
Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 134 4 (Utah 1984), S e e also, Graco Fishing 
& Rental Tools, Inc. v. Ironwood Exploration, Inc., 766 P.2d 1074 
(Utah 1988) . 
POINT II 
THE PENALTY ENHANCEMENT FOR DRUG ACTIVITIES 
NEAR A SCHOOL UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. S 58-37-
8(5)(a)(iii) (SUPP. 1989), IS 
CONSTITUTIONALLY BASED ON A LEGI UMA I E 
GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST. 
Defendant contends that Utah Code Ann, % "LiH-j • 
8 ( 5 ) ( a ) (i I I ) ( Supfi). 1989 ) , is unconstitutional because it 
art i tr ari 1 > and capricious 1 } enhances ppna 11 I es :f n i: narcotic 
activities occurring near a s rhool , Defendant s argument does 
not withstand constitutional analysis. 
In evaluating a constitutional challenge to a 
legislative enactment, the Utah Supreme Court will view the 
challenged statute with a strong presumption of 
constitutionality, resolving any reasonable doubt in favor of 
validity and constitutionality of the statute. Sims v. Smith, 571 
P.2d 586 (Utah 1977). Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805 (Utah 
1974); Peck v. Dunn, 574 P.2d 367 (Utah 1975), cert, denied, 436 
U.S. 927 (1978). Moreover, the burden of successfully 
challenging a statute as unconstitutional falls on the one 
attacking it. Branch v. Salt Lake County Service Area No. 2 
Cottonwood Heights, 23 Utah 2d 181, 460 P.2d 814 (1969). 
It is undisputed that a state has broad power to 
regulate the administration, sale, prescription, possession and 
use of narcotics. Under substantive due process analysis, such 
regulations are constitutional if the means selected in the 
statute have a rational relation to a legitimate governmental 
objective sought to be obtained. See United States v. Holland, 
810 F.2d 1215, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (applying "rationale basis" 
test to an equal protection challenge that federally enhanced 
penalties for selling drugs within 1000 feet of schoolyard is 
both over and underinclusive.) Thus, the statute must be upheld 
if wany state of facts rationally justifying it is demonstrated 
to or perceived by the courts." United States v. Maryland 
Savings-Share Insurance Corp., 400 U.S. 4, 6 (1970). 
In the case at bar, defendant challenges the 
constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(5)(a)(iii) (Supp. 
1989) which provides for enhanced penalties upon narcotics 
convictions where the drug activi ty occurred within one thousand 
feet of a public or private elementary or secondary school, 
Becausr* dpf einlan t fa 1 1 s t n si at v wh<i-jt) ler h :i - ^ <--; 
r-r equal protection claim is based on the federal < . state 
constitution, this Court should consdier his claims based only on 
the f edei " * - * I t u 1 i < i See State v. Williams , 1 0 1 1 11 ; i 1 :i Adv 
Rep. 48, :;: :. (S. Ct. 05/05/89). 
The United States Congress has enacted similar 
legislation t: ) iat ei :t! iai Ic:es pei ia,1 1:i es £oi ::Ii: ug ac 1:iv :i ty occurri ng 
near schools. In 1982, United States Senator Paula Hawkins 
introduced the enhancement statute following a congressional 
heard ng on drug abuse in .American school systems before tl le 
Subcommittee on Investigations and General Oversight of the 
Senate committee on Labor and Human Resources. At the I learing, 
Senator Hawkins pointed o"+- *-**»*-: 
an alarming number of school children, often 
as young as 11 or 12,' were using drugs and 
alcohol and that these drugs were 'often sold 
directly to the juveniles on or near school 
grounds by adult dealers. These transactions 
take place in remote outdoor areas, at local 
hangouts, or at nearby homes or apartment." 
130 Cong.Rec. S.559 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 
1984), The 1,000-foot rule was devised to 
'send a signal to drug dealers that we will 
not tolerate their presence near our schools. 
United States v. Jones, 7 79 F.2d 121, 122-23, (2nd Ci r 1985), 
cert, denied, 475 U.!". 1011 (19R6) I'lin , tin federal penalty 
e n h a n c e m e n t p r o i i SIIHIII1 WI i t \U " IIJIIHIJ iu i i lhs i inn ^ y e nii'iiy i i s r rimi'iiy 
minors by creating a "iliug-free zone around schools," United 
States v I di r.id 46, 50 (2nd Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 
475 U.S. 106B 
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Likewise, the State of Utah has a legitimate interest 
in combatting drug use and related evils among its school 
children which justifies the designation of a drug free perimeter 
around its schools. Establishing greater penalties for violating 
the drug free perimeter around schools is a rational means of 
serving the State's interest of eliminating drug use among and 
around school children. 
While impliedly conceding a legitimate governmental 
interest in curbing drug use among school children, defendant 
argues that the statute is overinclusive because it may apply to 
drug activity within private dwellings which are proximate to the 
school, but which do not involve children. Such an argument has 
been repeatedly rejected by other courts. See State v. Jones, 
779 F.2d 121 (defendant argued enhancement statute was 
unconstitutionally overinclusive because it applied to drugs 
transactions that involved adults); United States v. Nieves, 608 
F.Supp 1147 (D.C.N.Y. 1985) (defendant argued the enhancement 
statute was unconstitutional because defendant was not permitted 
to offer evidence that children were uninjured by the sale); 
United States v. Cunningham, 615 F. Supp 519 (D.C.N.Y. 1985) 
(defendant argued enhancement statute did not apply to him 
because his drug activity only involved adults); United States v. 
Holland, 810 F.2d 1215 (defendant argued enhancement statute is 
overinclusive because it can apply to drug transactions between 
adults that take place within private dwellings proximate to 
schools and during times when schools are not in session). 
Such arguments focus narrowly on a single illegal drug 
transaction while ignoring the broad purpose of the enhancement 
statute. Not on] y was the statute designed to punish drug 
activity dir ectly involvi i ig c 1 :i i II di en * i 1: 1 ii i i c »ne t! ic:>i isand feet of 
a school, but i t was a] so designed to protect schoo, children 
from the direct and indirect dangers of narcotics,, See United 
States v. Cunningham., 6 1 5 f Si lf > p at 5 20 Mr»i*envt»i
 ( 11 -1< ii • i i \\e 
rational basis analysis, the fit between the ends and the means 
need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims 
ro 1: ie const:ii ti Itiona 1 . Utah Public Employees ' Association v. 
State, 610 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1980), It Is enough that there is an 
evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that 
the particu lai' legislate i e i neasur €ji wai. a rat innaj way to correct 
i t. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 3 4 8 11,H, 4 B 3 (19 55) , Since 
the enhancement statute lessens the risk that drugs would be 
readi 1 y a1 ;,ral lable to children, the statute should be upheld as a 
rational means to deal wi th the State's interest i n deterring 
drug use among and around schoo] c 1 i i ] d::i : e:m: :i 
Defendant next contends that e narcotics statute 
inherently invests the prosecutor with e !,scrpt, i to charge 
d e f e n d a n t w i i h v t ! \ w \ a mi scienter - • 1 in -, e 
conduct and thus constitutes a <* .a o: equal protection of the 
laws. He claims thai lie should have r-e*-* charged wi th simple 
m i sderriean i | K J S S f * ^.L 11 H I W I f In nit "iia I I, y l:c T i o] at i i ig 
the drug free school zone. Defendan - lain Is merit! ess 
In State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257 (Utah 1 9 8 5 ) , the Utah 
S t J f n P H H J C n u l hi I i I lliil i11 (»i t Kset ut i u ili»*4 ni»| h i j i H i t 1 lireeil ' > 
choose between charging either a felony or a misdemeanor when re 
two crimes have exactly the same substantive elements. The Court 
held that it would be a denial of equal protection of the laws, 
"if the same identical facts may be used in prosecutions under 
two completely integrated statutes, one a misdemeanor and the 
other a felony." J^ d. at 261. (citations and italics omitted). 
In the present case, the two crimes are not identical. 
The felony possession statute is distinguishable from the 
misdemeanor possession statute because the possession of the 
drugs near a school is an additional substantive element of the 
felony offense. Thus, the Legislature has determined that the 
act of possessing drugs near a school should be punished more 
severely than the mere possession of drugs. As stated above, 
such a distinction is manifestly rational. 
It is well-established that the Legislature has the 
authority to determine the degree of punishment for specific 
crimes. As the Utah Supreme stated in State v. Clark, 632 P.2d 
841 (Utah 1981): 
It is not unconstitutional for a state to 
impose a more severe penalty for a particular 
type of crime than the penalty which is imposed 
with respect to the general category of crimes 
to which the special crime is related or of which 
it is a subcategory. . . . 
As long as the legislative classifications 
are not arbitrary, the fact that conduct 
violates both a general and a specific 
provision of the criminal laws does not 
render the legislation unconstitutional, even 
though one violation is subject to a greater 
sentence. 
Id. at 843-44. 
The more specific felony statute is noticeably 
different from the general misdemeanor crime of mere possession 
of a controlled substance because it defines possession of drugs 
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near a school as a substantive element. Because of the 
destructive nature of narcotics and the need for heightened 
deterrence when children are involved, such a distinction is not 
"arbitrary." Therefore, the prosecutor acted within his 
prosecutorial discretion when he charged defendant with a 
violation of a statute that "applies more specifically to the 
[defendant's] offense. . . ." Rammel v. Smith, 560 P.2d 1108, 
1110 (Utah 1977) . 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, defendant's conviction and 
sentence should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this <^^§^-day
 Qf June, 1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAN R. LARSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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to Daniel R. Knowton, attorney for appellant, 214 10th Avenue, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103, this ^ ^y^Tiay of June, 1989. 
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APPENDIX A 
MELVIN C. WILSON 3513 
Davis County Attorney 
Courthouse 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
Telephone: 451-3227 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CLEARFIELD DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, s 
In Re: Search of the 
premises described as : 
1487 South 1250 West, 
Syracuse, Davis County, Utah, : 
a single-family dwelling. 
SEARCH WARRANT 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) 
STATE OF UTAH ) ss: 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE COUNTY OF DAVIS: 
Proof by affidavit having this day been made before me by 
John Gardiner, a peace officer employed by Syracuse City, that he 
has reason to believe that in the below-described premises there 
are items which constitute evidence of the commission of a crime. 
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED in the daytime to make 
immediate search of the premises described as: 
1487 South 1250 West 
Syracuse, Davis County, Utah, 
A single-family dwelling 
and search for the following property: 
Controlled substances, 
Drug paraphernalia, 
Identification cards, records, accounts, 
books, pictures, receipts, personal 
property or other items evidencing 
ownership, occupation or control of the 
above premises or rooms therein. 
And if you find the same or any part thereof to bring it 
forthwith before me at the Circuit Court, County of Davis, or 
retain such property in your custody subject to the order of this 
Court. 
Given under my hand and dated this ^ZO day of May, 
1988. 
Cte&sc(Auk,.+ 
CircuitJ/Court Judge 
MELVIN C. WILSON 3513 
Davis County Attorney 
Courthouse 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
Telephone: 451-3227 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CLEARFIELD DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
In Re: Search of the 
premises described as : 
1487 South 1250 West, 
Syracuse, Davis County, Utah, : 
a single-family dwelling. 
: AFFIDAVIT FOR 
: SEARCH WARRANT 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) 
STATE OF UTAH ) ss: 
Before Alfred C. VanWagenen, Circuit Court Judge, the 
undersigned, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that he has 
probable cause to believe that on the premises which are 
described as: 
1487 South 1250 West 
Syracuse, Davis County, Utah, 
A single-family dwelling 
there is now certain property described as: 
Controlled substances, 
Drug paraphernalia, 
Identification cards, records, accounts, 
books, pictures, receipts, personal 
property or other items evidencing 
ownership, occupation or control of the 
above premises or rooms therein. 
xne racts to establish the issuance of this warrant are 
as follows: 
1. Affiant is a peace officer employed by Syracuse City 
and is involved in the investigation of an illegal sexual act 
alleged to have been committed by Lane Stromberg. 
2. On the 25th of April, 1988, a 15 year old girl stated 
to affiant that she was acquainted with Lane Stromberg, an adult 
male, and that she had had sexual intercourse with Stromberg at 
his residence at 1487 South 1250 West in Syracuse, Utah, during 
the first week of March, 1988. The girl stated that this 
occurred in an upstairs bedroom. 
3. The 15 year old girl stated that she has been to 
Stromberg's home several times in the past year and a half, as 
she is a close friend to Stromberg's own teen age daughter. 
During that time, the 15 year old said she has seen Stromberg 
smoking marijuana three or four times. She has seen various 
marijuana pipes lying around the house in various locations 
including on the bookshelf of Stromberg's water bed in his 
bedroom, in the kitchen area of the home, and in the room where 
Stromberg keeps his personal computer, in the basement. The last 
time she saw a marijuana pipe at his residence was the first week 
of March, 1988. She has not been in the home since then. 
4. Affiant believes the girl is giving reliable 
information. Affiant has verified with a school counselor that 
the girl and Stromberg's daughter are good friends and that the 
girl has no juvenile court record. Furthermore affiant has 
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JOSEPH E TESCH 
CHIEF DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
October 27, 1988 
Mary Noonan 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: State v. Lane C. Strombergf Case No. 860618-CA 
Dear Ms. Noonan: 
Pursuant to R. Utah Ct. App. 24(j) (1989), respondent 
cites State v. Lonnie L. Moore, No. 870470 slip op. (Utah Oct. 
25, 1989) as supplemental authority for the court's consideration 
relevant to Point II of respondent's brief in the above-entitled 
case. 
Assistant Attorney General 
DRL:bks 
cc: Daniel Knowlton 
STATE OF UTAH 
checked Lane Stromberg's criminal record, which shows a 
conviction for possession of marijuana dated February 14# 1980. 
5. Affiant has spoken to Lon Brian, an undercover 
narcotics officer employed by the Davis Metro Narcotics Strike 
Force. Officer Brian has received training from the federal DEA 
regarding drugs and undercover drug operations, has worked for 
nearly three years as an undercover narcotics officer, and has 
witnessed thousands of drug transactions involving the use, 
possession, and sales of controlled substances. 
6. Officer Brian is familiar with the facts of this 
case. Based on his training and experience, a person who 
occasionally smokes marijuana in his own home retains possession 
of the pipes or other paraphernalia for long periods of time, up 
to several years. 
WHEREFORE, affiant prays that a search warrant be issued 
for the search of the above-described premises and the seizure 
of any of the said items. 
Affianjt 
Subscribed and sworn to me this J A Q day of May, 1988. 
Circuit /rfourt Judge 
COUNTY OF DAVIS 
RETURN OF SEARCH WARRANT 
I hereby c e r t i f y , and return, that by v i r t u e of the wi th in 
Search Warrant to me d irec ted , Ihave*searched for the goods and 
c h a t t e l s therein named, at the place therein descr ibed: (Str ike 
e i ther (1) or (2) , whichever i s inapplicable) 
(1) and that I have such goods and c h a t t e l s before the 
Court, described as fo l lows: 
On May 20, 1988 the search of the residence was executed as per 
the Search Warrant issued through the Clearfield Circuit Court. Please find 
attached copies of a l l items secured as evidence. 
I , Lon Brian, the o f f i c e r by whom t h i s 
Warrant was executed, do swear that trie above inventory conta ins a true 
and d e t a i l e d account of a l l the property taken by me on the Warrant 
Peacq^pfficer, Af f iant 
Subscribed and sworn to before rmja t h i s day of Nf i i lL 
